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Abstract 
We argue that the U.S. personal saving rate’s long stability (1960s–1980s), subsequent 
steady decline (1980s–2007), and recent substantial rise (2008–2011) can be interpreted 
using a parsimonious ‘buffer stock’ model of consumption in the presence of labor income 
uncertainty and credit constraints. Saving in the model is affected by the gap between ‘target’ 
and actual wealth, with the target determined by credit conditions and uncertainty. An 
estimated structural version of the model suggests that increased credit availability accounts 
for most of the long-term saving decline, while fluctuations in wealth and uncertainty capture 
the bulk of the business-cycle variation. 
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Notes: The saving rate is expressed as a percent of disposable income. The ﬁgure shows the
deviation from its value at the start of recession (in percentage points). Historical Range includes
all recessions after 1960q1 (when quarterly data become available).
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
1 Introduction
The remarkable rise in personal saving during the Great Recession has sparked fresh interest
in the determinants of saving decisions. In the United States, for example, the increase in
household saving since 2007 was generally sharper than after any other postwar recession
(see Figure 1), and the personal saving rate has remained well above its pre-crisis value for
the past ﬁve years.
1 While the saving rise partly reﬂected a decline in spending on durable
goods, spending on nondurables and services was also unprecedentedly weak.
2
1We focus on the U.S. because of its central role in triggering the global economic crisis, and because of the rich existing
literature studying U.S. data; but the U.K., Ireland, and many other countries also saw substantial increases in personal
saving rates. See Mody, Ohnsorge, and Sandri (2012) for systematic international evidence.
2Complex issues of measurement, such as the appropriate treatment of durables, the proper role and measurement of
deﬁned beneﬁt pension plan status, the extent to which households pierce the corporate veil, and many others, make analysisCarroll (1992) invoked precautionary motives to explain the tendency of saving to
increase during recessions, showing that an older modeling tradition
3 emphasizing the
role of “wealth eﬀects” did not capture cyclical dynamics adequately, particularly for the
ﬁrst of the ‘postmodern’
4 recessions in 1990–91 when wealth changed little but saving and
unemployment expectations rose markedly.
A largely separate literature has addressed another longstanding puzzle: The steady
decline in the U.S. personal saving rate, from over 10 percent of disposable income in the
early 1980s to a mere 1 percent in the mid-2000s;
5,6 here, a prominent theme has been
the role of ﬁnancial liberalization in making it easier for households to borrow.
7 Some
very recent work (Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011), Eggertsson and Krugman (2011), Hall
(2011)) has argued (though without much attempt at quantiﬁcation) that a sudden sharp
reversal of this credit-loosening trend played a large role in the recent saving rise.
8
This paper aims to quantify these three channels, both over the long span of historical
experience and for the period since the beginning of the Great Recession.
To ﬁx ideas, the paper begins by presenting (in section 2) a tractable ‘buﬀer stock’
saving model with explicit and transparent roles for each of the inﬂuences emphasized
above (the precautionary, wealth, and credit channels). The model’s key intuition is
that, in the presence of income uncertainty, optimizing households have a target wealth
ratio that depends on the usual theoretical considerations (risk aversion, time preference,
expected income growth, etc), and on two features that have been harder to incorporate
into analytical models: The degree of labor income uncertainty and the availability of
credit. Our model yields a tractable analytical solution that can be used to calibrate how
much saving should go up in response to an increase in uncertainty, or a negative shock to
wealth, or a tightening of liquidity constraints.
of the personal saving rate as measured by the National Income and Product Accounts a problematic enterprise. Since there
are few satisfactory solutions to any of these problems, our approach is to ignore them all, following a long tradition in (some
of) the literature. See Kmitch (2010), Perozek and Reinsdorf (2002), and Congressional Budget Oﬃce (1993) for detailed
discussion of these and other measurement issues.
3See Davis and Palumbo (2001) for an exposition, estimation, and review.
4Krugman (2012) seems to have coined the term ‘postmodern’ to capture the change in the pattern of business cycle
dynamics dating from the 1990–91 recession (particularly the slowness of employment to recover compared to output). But
the pattern has been noted by many other macroeconomists.
5We should note here that personal saving rates tend to be one of the most heavily revised data series in the NIPA
accounts, and that substantial revisions can occur even many years after the BEA’s “ﬁrst ﬁnal” estimates are made (Nakamura
and Stark (2007), Deutsche Bank Securities (2012)); the revisions are systematically upward-biased, and often as much as
1–2 percent, so it would not be surprising if some years from now the saving decline in the 2000s appears to be smaller than in
the data used here. It seems very unlikely, however, that either the broad trends or the business-cycle frequency movements
will be revised greatly; past revisions have tended to be at medium frequencies, and not at either the very low or very high
frequencies that tend to provide most of our identiﬁcation.
6 Although NIPA accounting conventions impart an inﬂation-related bias to the measurement of personal saving, the
downward trend in saving remains obvious even in an inﬂation-adjusted measure of the saving rate.
7See Parker (2000) for a comprehensive analysis; see Aron, Duca, Muellbauer, Murata, and Murphy (2011) for
comparative evidence from the U.S., the U.K., and Japan emphasizing the role of credit conditions in determining saving in
all three countries.
8A new paper by Challe and Ragot (2012) calibrates a quantitative model with aggregate and idiosyncratic uncertainty
and time-varying precautionary saving, and documents that the model can produce a plausible response of consumption to
aggregate shocks.
Alan, Crossley, and Low (2012) simulate a model with idiosyncratic uncertainty and ﬁnd that the rise of the saving rate in
the recessions is driven by increase in uncertainty rather than tightening of credit.
2We highlight one particularly interesting implication of the model: In response to a
permanent worsening in economic circumstances (such as a permanent increase in unem-
ployment risk), consumption initially ‘overshoots’ its ultimate permanent adjustment. This
reﬂects the fact that, when the target level of wealth rises, not only is a higher level of
steady-state saving needed to maintain a higher target level of wealth, an immediate further
boost to saving is necessary to move from the current (inadequate) level of wealth up to the
new (higher) target. An interesting implication is that if the economy suﬀers from adjust-
ment costs (as macroeconomic models strongly suggest), an optimizing government might
wish to counteract the component of the consumption decline that reﬂects ‘overshooting.’
In an economy rendered non-Ricardian by liquidity constraints and/or uncertainty, this
provides a potential rationale for countercyclical ﬁscal policy, either targeted at households
or to boost components of aggregate demand other than household spending in order to
oﬀset the temporary downward overshooting of consumption.
After section 3’s discussion of data and measurement issues, section 4 presents a reduced-
form empirical model, motivated by the theory, that attempts to measure the relative
importance of each of these three eﬀects (precautionary, wealth, and credit) for the U.S.
personal saving rate. An OLS analysis of the personal saving rate ﬁnds a statistically
signiﬁcant and economically important role for all three explanatory variables. The model’s
estimated coeﬃcients imply that the largest contributor to the decline in consumption
during the Great Recession was the collapse in household wealth, with the increase in
precautionary saving also making a substantial contribution; the role of measured changes
in credit availability is estimated to have played a substantially smaller (though not
negligible) role.
Section 5 constructs a more explicit relationship between the theoretical model and
the empirical results, by making a direct identiﬁcation between the model’s parameters
(like unemployment risk) and the corresponding empirical objects (like households’ unem-
ployment expectations constructed using the Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan’s
Surveys of Consumers). We show that the structural model ﬁts the data essentially as well
as the reduced form model, but with the usual advantage of structural models that it is
possible to use the estimated model to provide a disciplined investigation of quantitative
theoretical issues such as whether there is an interaction between the precautionary motive
and credit constraints. (We ﬁnd some evidence that there is).
2 Theory: Target Wealth and Credit Conditions
Carroll and Toche (2009) (henceforth CT) provide a tractable framework for analyzing the
impact of nonﬁnancial uncertainty, in the speciﬁc form of unemployment risk, on optimal
household saving. Carroll and Jeanne (2009) show that the lessons from the individual’s
problem, solved below, carry over with little modiﬁcation to the characterization of the
behavior of aggregate variables in a small open economy. A satisfactory closed-economy
general equilibrium analysis remains elusive (though see Challe and Ragot (2012) for a
3valiant eﬀort.) Such an analysis would be useful because a crucial question is the extent
to which each of the inﬂuences we measure is an “impulse” versus the extent to which
it is a “propagation mechanism” or a consequence of deeper unmeasured forces. (In the
Great Recession, the collapse in consumer conﬁdence seems to have preceded the credit
tightening; the wealth decline began before either of the other two variables moved, but
its sharpest contractions came after both other variables had deteriorated sharply). In the
absence of fully satisfactory framework that captures and identiﬁes all these questions, we
propose that our simple structural model provides a useful framework for organizing and
thinking about the issues.
The consumer maximizes the discounted sum of utility from an intertemporally separable
CRRA utility function u(•)=•1−ρ/(1 − ρ) subject to the dynamic budget constraint:
mt+1 =( mt − ct)R +  t+1Wt+1ξt+1,
where next period’s market resources mt+1 are the sum of current market resources net
of consumption ct, augmented by the (constant) interest factor R =1+r, and with the
addition of labor income. The level of labor income is determined by the individual’s
productivity   (lower case letters designate individual-level variables), the (upper-case)
aggregate wage Wt+1 (per unit of productivity) and a zero–one indicator of the consumer’s
employment status ξ.
The assumption that makes the model tractable is that unemployment risk takes a
particularly stark form: Employed consumers face a constant probability  of becoming
unemployed, and, once unemployed, the consumer can never become employed again.
9
Under these assumptions, CT derive a formula for the steady-state target ˇ m that depends
on unemployment risk , the interest rate r, the growth rate of wages ΔW, relative risk
aversion ρ, and the discount factor β:
10
ˇ m = f(
(+)
, r
(+)
,ΔW
(−)
, ρ
(+)
,β
(+)
). (1)
Target m increases with unemployment risk, because in response to higher uncertainty,
consumers choose to build up a larger precautionary buﬀer of wealth to protect their
spending. (The increase in  is a pure increase in risk (a mean-preserving spread in
human wealth) because productivity is assumed to grow by the factor 1/(1 − ) each
period,  t+1 =  t/(1 − ) (see Carroll and Toche (2009), p. 6)). A higher interest rate
increases the rewards to holding wealth and thus increases the amount held. Faster income
9Of course, if a starting population of such consumers were not refreshed by an inﬂow of new employed consumers,
the population unemployment rate would asymptote to 100 percent. This problem can easily be addressed by introducing
explicit demographics (which do not aﬀect the optimization problem of the employed): Each period new employed consumers
are born and a fraction of existing households dies, as in Carroll and Jeanne (2009). Because demographic eﬀects are very
gradual, the implications of the more complicated model are well captured by the simpler model presented here that ignores
demographics and the behavior of the unemployed population.
10Speciﬁcally, the steady-state target wealth can be approximated as
ˇ m =1+
1
þr(ˆ pγ/ ) − þγ
,
where þr =l o g

(Rβ)1/ρ
R, þγ =l o g

(Rβ)1/ρ
Γ, ˆ þγ = þγ(1 + þγω/ ), Γ=( 1+Δ W)/(1 −  ) and ω =( ρ − 1)/2.
4Figure 2 Consumption Function (Stable Arm of Phase Diagram)
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Source: Calculations by the authors using the CT model; code generating ﬁgure is in online archive
growth translates into a lower wealth target because households who anticipate higher
future income consume more now in anticipation of their future prosperity (the ‘human
wealth eﬀect’). Finally, risk aversion and the discount factor have eﬀects on target wealth
that are qualitatively similar to the eﬀects of uncertainty and the interest rate, respectively.
While the unemployment risk in Carroll and Toche (2009) is of a simple form, the key
mechanisms at work are the same as those in more sophisticated setups with a realistic
speciﬁcation of uninsurable risks (building on the work of Bewley (1977), Skinner (1988),
Zeldes (1989), Deaton (1991), Carroll (1992), Carroll (1997) and many others).
Figure 2 shows the phase diagram for the CT model. The consumption function is
indicated by the thick solid locus, which is the saddle path that leads to the steady state
at which the ratios of both consumption and market resources to income (c and m) are
constant.
11
This consumption function can be used directly to analyze the consequences of an
exogenous shock to wealth of the kind contemplated in the old “wealth eﬀects” literature,
or in the AEA Presidential Address of Hall (2011).
12 The consequences of a pure shock
to wealth are depicted in ﬁgure 3 and are straightforward: Consumption declines upon
impact, to a level below the value that would leave me constant (the leftmost red dot);
11For a detailed intuitive exposition of the model, see
http://econ.jhu.edu/people/ccarroll/public/lecturenotes/consumption/tractablebufferstock/.
12Like that literature, we take the wealth shock to be exogenous. It is clear from the prior literature starting with
Merton (1969) and Samuelson (1969) that not much would change if a risky return were incorporated and the wealth shock
were interpreted as a particularly bad realization of the stochastic return on assets. The much more diﬃcult problem of
constructing a plausible general equilibrium theory of endogenous asset pricing that could justify the observed wealth shocks
has not yet been satisfactorily solved, which is why we follow Hall (2011) in treating wealth shocks at the beginning of the
Great Recession as exogenous.
5Figure 3 A Wealth Shock
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because consumption is below income, me (and thus ce) rises over time back toward the
original target (the sequence of dots).
CT’s model deliberately omitted explicit liquidity constraints in order to emphasize
the point that uncertainty induces concavity of the consumption function (that is, a higher
marginal propensity to consume for people with low levels of wealth) even in the absence of
constraints (for a general proof of this proposition, see Carroll and Kimball (1996)). Indeed,
because the employed consumer is always at risk of a transition into the unemployed state
where income will be zero, the ‘natural borrowing constraint’ in this model prevents the
consumer from ever choosing to go into debt, because an indebted unemployed consumer
with zero income might be forced to consume zero or a negative amount (incurring negative
inﬁnity utility) in order to satisfy the budget constraint.
We make only one modiﬁcation to the CT model for the purpose at hand: We intro-
duce an ‘unemployment insurance’ system that guarantees a positive level of income for
unemployed households. In the presence of such insurance, households with low levels of
market resources will be willing to borrow because they will not starve even if they become
unemployed. This change induces a leftward shift in the consumption function by an
amount corresponding to the present discounted value of the unemployment beneﬁt. The
consumer will limit his indebtedness, however, to an amount small enough to guarantee
that consumption will remain strictly positive even when unemployed (this requirement
deﬁnes the ‘natural borrowing constraint’ in this model).
We could easily add a tighter ‘artiﬁcial’ liquidity constraint, imposed exogenously by the
ﬁnancial system, that would prevent the consumer from borrowing as much as the natural
borrowing constraint permits. But Carroll (2001) shows that the eﬀects of tightening an
6Figure 4 Relaxation of a Natural Borrowing Constraint from 0 to h
 Orig Target
t1
e  0
 Orig 
New  
 0.


Source: Calculations by the authors using the CT model; code generating ﬁgure is in online archive
artiﬁcial constraint are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the eﬀects of tightening
the natural borrowing constraint; while we do not doubt that artiﬁcial borrowing con-
straints exist and are important, we do not incorporate them into our framework since
we can capture their consequences by manipulating the natural borrowing constraint that
is already an essential element of the model. Indeed, using this strategy, our empirical
estimates below will interpret the process of ﬁnancial liberalization which began in the
U.S. in the early 1980s and arguably continued until the eve of the Great Recession as the
major explanation for the long downtrend in the saving rate.
Figure 4 shows that the model reproduces the standard result from the existing literature
(see, e.g., Carroll (2001), Muellbauer (2007), Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2011), Hall (2011)):
Relaxation of the borrowing constraint (from an initial position of 0. in which no borrowing
occurs, to a new value in which the natural borrowing limit is h implying minimum net
worth of −h) leads to an immediate increase in consumption for a given level of resources.
But over time, the higher spending causes the consumer’s level of wealth to decline, forcing
a corresponding gradual decline in consumption until wealth eventually settles at its new,
lower target level. (For vivid illustration, parameter values for this ﬁgure were chosen such
that the new target level of wealth is negative; that is, the consumer would be in debt, in
equilibrium).
Rather than presenting another phase diagram analysis, we illustrate our next experi-
ment by showing the dynamics of the saving rate rather than the level of consumption over
time. (Since both saving and consumption are strictly monotonic functions of me, there is
a mathematical equivalence between the two ways of presenting the results).
Figure 5 shows the consequences of a permanent increase in unemployment risk :A n
7Figure 5 Dynamics of the Saving Rate after an Increase in Unemployment Risk
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Source: Calculations by the authors using the CT model; code generating ﬁgure is in online archive
immediate jump in the saving rate, followed by a gradual decline toward a new equilibrium
rate that is higher than the original one.
Qualitatively, the eﬀects of an increase in risk are essentially the opposite of a credit
loosening: In response to a human-wealth-preserving spread in unemployment risk, the
level of consumption falls sharply as consumers begin the process of accumulation toward a
higher target wealth ratio.
13 The ﬁgure illustrates the ‘overshooting’ proposition mentioned
in the introduction: All of the initial increase in saving reﬂects a drop in consumption
(by construction, the mean-preserving spread in unemployment risk leaves current income
unchanged), and consumption recovers only gradually toward its ultimately higher target.
For a long time, the saving rate remains above either its pre-shock level or its new target.
Economists’ instinct (developed in complete-markets and perfect-foresight models) is
that privately optimal behavior also usually has a plausible claim to reﬂect a socially
eﬃcient outcome. This is emphatically not the case for movements in precautionary saving
against idiosyncratic risk in models with imperfect capital markets. It has long been known
that such precautionary saving generates socially ‘excessive’ saving (see, e.g., Aiyagari
(1993)). So the presumption from economic theory is that the increase in the precautionary
motive following an increase in uninsurable risk is socially ineﬃcient. The ineﬃciency would
be even greater if we were to add to our model a production sector like the one that has
13The model is speciﬁed in such a way that an increase in the parameter   that we are calling the ‘unemployment risk’
here actually induces an oﬀsetting increase in the expected mean level of income (an increase in   is a mean-preserving
spread in the relevant sense); the spending of a consumer with certainty-equivalent preferences therefore would not change in
response to a change in  , so we can attribute all of the increase in the saving rate depicted in the ﬁgure to the precautionary
motive.
8become standard in DSGE models in which there are costs of adjustment to the amount
of aggregate investment (e.g., Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005)).
While the implications for optimal ﬁscal policy are beyond the scope of our analysis, it
is clear that a number of policies could either mitigate the consumption decline (e.g., an
increase in social insurance) or replace the corresponding deﬁciency in aggregate demand
(e.g., by an increase in government spending). We leave further exploration of these ideas
to later work, or other authors.
One objection to the model might be that its extreme assumption about the nature of
unemployment risk (once unemployed, the consumer can never become reemployed) calls
into question its practical usefulness except as a convenient stylized treatment of the logic
of precautionary saving. Our view is that such a criticism would be misplaced, for several
reasons. First, when unemployment risk in the model is set to zero, the model collapses
to the standard Ramsey model that has been a workhorse for much of macroeconomic
analysis for the past 40 years (see Carroll and Toche (2009) for details). It seems perverse
to criticize the model for moving at least a step in the direction of realism by introducing a
precautionary motive into that framework. Second, this paper’s authors have been active
participants in the literature that builds far more realistic models of precautionary saving,
but our considered judgment is that in the present context the virtues of transparency
and simplicity far outweigh the model’s cost in realism. Models are metaphors, not high-
deﬁnition photographs, and if a certain ﬂexibility of interpretation is granted to use a
simple model that has most of the right parts, more progress can sometimes be made than
by building a state-of-the-art Titanic.
In sum, the model emphasizes three factors that aﬀect saving and that might vary
substantially over time. First, because the precautionary motive diminishes as wealth
rises, the saving rate is a declining function of market resources mt. Second, since an
expansion in the availability of credit reduces the target level of wealth, looser credit
conditions (designated CEAt, for reasons articulated below) lead to lower saving. Finally,
higher unemployment risk t results in greater saving for precautionary reasons.
The framework thus suggests that if proxies for these variables can be found, a reduced-
form regression for the saving rate st
st = γ0 + γmmt + γCEACEAt + γ t + γ
 Xt + εt (2)
should satisfy the following conditions:
γm < 0,γ CEA < 0,γ   > 0, (3)
where CEAt denotes the “Credit Easing Accumulated” index, a measure of credit supply
(described in detail below), and the vector Xt collects other drivers of saving that are
outside the scope of the model, such as demographics, corporate and government saving,
etc. We estimate regressions of the form (2) in section 4 below.
To economists steeped in the wisdom of Irving Fisher (1930), according to whom the
consumption path is determined by lifetime resources independently of the income path
(‘Fisherian separation holds’), equation (2) may seem like a throwback to the bad old days
9of nonstructural Keynesian estimation of the kind that fell into disrepute after spectacular
failures in the 1970s. Below, however, we will show that, at least under our assumptions, a
reduced form estimation of such an equation can in principle yield estimates of “structural”
parameters like the time preference rate. (An important part of the reason this exercise is
not implausible is that, with the exception of a few easily identiﬁed episodes, the time path
of personal income is not very far from a random walk with drift, justifying the identiﬁcation
of actual aggregate personal income with ‘permanent income’ in a Friedmanian sense).
14
3 Data and Measurement Issues
Before presenting estimation results we introduce our dataset. Because our empirical
measure of credit conditions begins in 1966q2, our analysis begins at that date and extends
(at the present writing) through 2011q1.
15,16 The saving rate is from the BEA’s National
Income and Product Accounts and is expressed as a percentage of disposable income.
17,18
Market resources mt are measured as 1 plus the ratio of household net worth to disposable
income, in line with the model (Figure 6).
19 Our measure of credit supply conditions,
which we call the Credit Easing Accumulated index (CEA, see Figure 7), is constructed
in the spirit of Muellbauer (2007)a n dDuca, Muellbauer, and Murphy (2010)u s i n gt h e
question on consumer installment loans from the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Oﬃcer
Opinion Survey (SLOOS) on Bank Lending Practices (see also Fernandez-Corugedo and
Muellbauer (2006)a n dHall (2011)). The question asks about banks’ willingness to make
consumer installment loans now as opposed to three months ago (we use this index because
it is available since 1966; other measures of credit availability, such as for mortgage lending,
14More precisely, an empirical decomposition of NIPA personal disposable income into permanent and transitory
components (in which income consists of unobserved random walk with drift and white noise) assigns almost all variation in
(measured) income to its permanent component, so that a ratio to actual income will coincide almost perfectly with a ratio
to estimated ‘permanent’ income. This is not surprising because, as is well-known (and also documented in Appendix 2), it
is diﬃcult to reject the proposition that almost all shocks to the level of aggregate income are permanent; autocorrelation
functions and partial autocorrelation functions indicate that log-level of disposable income is close to a random walk; see our
further discussion in Appendix 2.
15Most time series were downloaded from Haver Analytics, and were originally compiled by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis, the Bureau of Labor Statistics or the Federal Reserve.
16We are reluctant to use more recent data because personal saving rate statistics are subject to particularly large revisions
until the data have been subjected to at least one annual revision (Deutsche Bank Securities (2012); Nakamura and Stark
(2007)).
17As a robustness check, we have also re-estimated our models with alternative measures of saving: Gross household
saving as a fraction of disposable income, gross and net private saving as a fraction of GDP, inﬂation-adjusted personal
saving rate and two measures of saving from the Flow of Funds (with/without consumer durables). The inﬂation-adjusted
saving rate deducts from saving the erosion in the value of money-denominated assets due to inﬂation. The Flow of Funds
(FoF) calculates saving as the sum of the net acquisition of ﬁnancial assets and tangible assets minus the net increase in
liabilities. Because this FoF-based measure is substantially more volatile, the ﬁt of the model is worse than for the NIPA-based
PSR. However, the main messages of the paper remain unchanged.
18Many reasonable objections can be made to this, or any other, speciﬁc measure of the personal saving rate, including
the treatment of durable goods, the treatment of capital gains and losses, and so on. While some defense of the NIPA measure
could be made in response to many of these challenges, such defenses would take us too far aﬁeld, and we refer the reader to
the extensive discussions of these measurement issues that date at least back to Friedman (1957).
19This variable is lagged by one quarter to account for the fact that data on net worth are reported as the end-of-period
values.
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move closely with the index on consumer installment loans over the sample period when
both are available). To calculate a proxy for the level of credit conditions, the scores from
the survey were accumulated, weighting the responses by the debt–income ratio to account
for the increasing trend in that variable.
20 (The index is normalized between 0 and 1 to
make the interpretation of regression coeﬃcients straightforward.)
The CEA index is taken to measure the availability/supply of credit to a typical house-
hold through factors other than the level of interest rates—for example, through loan–
value and loan–income ratios, availability of mortgage equity withdrawal and mortgage
reﬁnancing. The broad trends in the CEA index correlate strongly with measures ﬁnancial
reforms of Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2008), and measures of banking deregulation
of Demyanyk, Ostergaard, and Sørensen (2007) (see panel A of their Figure 1, p. 2786
and Appendix 1).
21 In addition, they seem to reﬂect well the key developments of the
U.S. ﬁnancial market institutions as described in McCarthy and Peach (2002), Dynan,
Elmendorf, and Sichel (2006), Green and Wachter (2007), Campbell and Hercowitz (2009),
and Aron, Duca, Muellbauer, Murata, and Murphy (2011), among others, which we
20As in Muellbauer (2007), we use the question on consumer installment loans rather than mortgages because the latter
is only available starting in 1990q2 and the question changed in 2007q2. Our CEA index diﬀers from Muellbauer (2007)’s
Credit Conditions Index in that Muellbauer accumulates raw answers, not weighting them by the debt–income ratio.
21Duca, Muellbauer, and Murphy (2011) document an increasing trend in loan–value ratios for ﬁrst-time home buyers (in
data from the American Housing Survey, 1979–2007), an indicator which is arguably to some extent aﬀected by ﬂuctuations
in demand.
11Figure 7 The Credit Easing Accumulated (CEA) Index
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
1
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Notes: Shading—NBER recessions.
Sources: Federal Reserve, accumulated scores from the question on change in the banks’ willingness to provide consumer installment loans from
the Senior Loan Oﬃcer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/.
summarize as follows: Until the early 1980s, the U.S. consumer lending markets were
heavily regulated and segmented. After the phaseout of interest rate controls beginning in
the early 1980s, the markets became more competitive, spurring ﬁnancial innovations that
led to greater access to credit. Technological progress leading to new ﬁnancial instruments
and better credit screening methods, a greater role of nonbanking ﬁnancial institutions, and
the increased use of securitization all contributed to the dramatic rise in credit availability
from the early 1980s until the onset of the Great Recession in 2007. The subsequent
signiﬁcant drop in the CEA index was associated with the funding diﬃculties and de-
leveraging of ﬁnancial institutions. As a caveat, it is important to acknowledge that CEA
might to some degree be inﬂuenced by developments from the demand rather than the
supply side of the credit market. But whatever its ﬂaws in this regard, indexes of this sort
seem to be gaining increasing acceptance as the best available measures of credit supply
(as distinguished from credit demand).
22
We measure a proxy Et ut+4 for unemployment risk t using re-scaled answers to the
22We have veriﬁed that our results do not materially change when we use the credit conditions index of Duca, Muellbauer,
and Murphy (2010), which diﬀers from our CEA in that Duca, Muellbauer, and Murphy explicitly remove identiﬁable eﬀects
of interest rates and the macroeconomic outlook from the SLOOS data using regression techniques. Since the results are
similar using both measures, our interpretation is that our measure is at least not merely capturing the most obvious cyclical
components of credit demand. As reported below, including in Appendix 1, our results also do not change when we use the
Financial Liberalization Index of Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2008)—which is based on the readings of ﬁnancial laws
and regulations—as an instrument for CEA.
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question about the expected change in unemployment in the Thomson Reuters/University
of Michigan Surveys of Consumers.
23 In particular, we estimate Et ut+4 using ﬁtted val-
ues Δ4ˆ ut+4 from the regression of the four-quarter-ahead change in unemployment rate
Δ4ut+4 ≡ ut+4 − ut on the answer in the survey, summarized with a balance statistic
UExp
BS
t :
Δ4ut+4 = α0 + α1UExp
BS
t + εt+4,
Et ut+4 = ut +Δ 4ˆ ut+4.
The coeﬃcient α1 is highly statistically signiﬁcant (indicating that households do have
substantial information about the direction of future changes in the unemployment rate).
Our Et ut+4 series, which—as expected—is strongly correlated with unemployment rate
and indeed precedes its dynamics, is shown in Figure 8.
24
23The relevant question is: “How about people out of work during the coming 12 months—do you think that there will
be more unemployment than now, about the same, or less?”
24We have checked that the conclusions of our analysis essentially do not change if we replaced Et ut+4 with the raw
unemployment series ut, but we use the former series below because it is closer to the ‘true’ perceived labor income risk.
13Figure 9 The Fit of the Baseline Model and the Time Trend—Actual and Fitted PSR
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4 Reduced-Form Saving Regressions
Before proceeding to structural estimation of the model of section 2 we investigate a simple
reduced-form benchmark:
st = γ1 + γmmt + γCEACEAt + γEuEt ut+4 + γt t + γ
 Xt + εt. (4)
Such a speciﬁcation can be readily estimated using OLS or IV estimators, and at a minimum
can be interpreted as summarizing basic stylized facts about the data.
4.1 Baseline Estimates
Table 1 reports the estimated coeﬃcients from several variations on equation (4). The ﬁrst
four columns show univariate speciﬁcations in which the saving rate is in turn regressed
on each of the three determinants analyzed above: wealth, credit conditions, and unem-
ployment risk. In each speciﬁcation we include the time trend to investigate how much
each regressor contributes to explaining the PSR beyond the portion that can be captured
mechanically by a linear time eﬀect. The three coeﬃcients have the signs predicted by the
model of section 2 and are statistically signiﬁcant. Univariate regressions capture up to 85
percent of variation in saving.
14But the univariate models on their own do not adequately describe the dynamics of
the PSR. As the model labeled “All 3” in the ﬁfth column shows, the three key variables
of interest—wealth, credit conditions, and unemployment risk—jointly explain roughly 90
percent of the variation in the saving rate over the past ﬁve decades. As expected, the
point estimates again indicate a strong negative correlation between saving and net wealth
and credit conditions and a positive correlation with unemployment risk. Interestingly,
once the three variables are included jointly, the time trend ceases to be signiﬁcant, which
is in line with the fact that the three models in columns 2–4 have higher ¯ R2 than the
univariate model with the time trend only.
25
A more parsimonious version of the model without the time trend reported in column
6 (Baseline)—as also suggested by the model in section 2—neatly summarizes the key
features of the saving rate. The estimated coeﬃcient on net wealth implies the (direct)
long-run marginal propensity to consume of about 1.2 cents out of a dollar of (total)
wealth. The value is low compared to much of the literature, which typically estimates
a marginal propensity to consume out of wealth (MPCW) of about 3–7 cents without
explicitly accounting for credit conditions.
26 However, a univariate model regressing the
PSR just on net wealth (not reported here), implies an MPCW of 4.3 percent. These
results suggest that much of what has been interpreted as pure “wealth eﬀects” in the prior
literature may actually have reﬂected precautionary or credit availability eﬀects that are
correlated with wealth.
The coeﬃcient on the Credit Easing Accumulated index is highly statistically signiﬁcant
with a t statistic of −10.7. The point estimate of γCEA implies that increased access
to credit over the sample period until the Great Recession reduced the PSR by about 6
percentage points of disposable income. In the aftermath of the Recession, the CEA index
declined between 2007 and 2010 by roughly 0.11 as credit supply tightened, contributing
roughly 0.64 percentage point to the increase in the PSR (see the discussion of Table 4
below for more detail).
Figure 9 further illustrates why we ﬁnd the “baseline” speciﬁcation in column 6 more
appealing than the more atheoretical model with a linear time trend. The trends in saving
and the CEA are both non-linear, moving consistently with each other even within our
sample and often persistently departing from the linear trend (as indicated by the time-
only model’s substantially lower ¯ R2). In addition, it is likely that the time-only model will
become increasingly problematic as observations beyond our sample accumulate, arguably
providing additional evidence on a possible structural break in the time model during the
Great Recession.
27
25Estimating univariate saving regressions without the time trend results in higher ¯ R2 for wealth and the credit
conditions—0.72 and 0.80, respectively—than for the “time” model in column one (0.70). (Because unemployment risk
is not trending, it captures relatively little variation in saving on its own (about 10 percent) but is important in addition to
the two other factors, as illustrated in columns 4 and 5.)
26See, for example, Skinner (1996), Ludvigson and Steindel (1999), Lettau and Ludvigson (2004), Case, Quigley, and
Shiller (2005), and Carroll, Otsuka, and Slacalek (2011). See Muellbauer (2007) and Duca, Muellbauer, and Murphy (2010)
for a model which includes a measure of credit conditions in the consumption function.
27Reliable PSR data only start in 1959 and document that the downward trend in saving started around 1975, so that
15Finally, the last model investigates the joint eﬀect of credit conditions and unemployment
risk. The structural model of section 2 implies that uncertainty aﬀects saving more
strongly when credit constraints bind tightly; the model in column 7 (Interact) conﬁrms
the prediction with a (borderline) signiﬁcant negative interaction term between the CEA
and unemployment risk.
28
4.2 Robustness Checks
Table 2 presents a second battery of speciﬁcation checks of the baseline model shown
again for reference as the ﬁrst ‘model.’ The second model (Uncertainty) investigates the
eﬀects of adding to the baseline regression an alternative proxy for uncertainty: the Bloom,
Floetotto, and Jaimovich (2009) index of macroeconomic and ﬁnancial uncertainty.
29 The
new variable is statistically insigniﬁcant and the coeﬃcients on the previously included
variables are broadly unchanged, suggesting that our baseline uncertainty measure is
more appropriate for our purposes (which makes sense, as personal saving is conducted
by persons, whose uncertainty is likely better captured by our measure of labor income
uncertainty than by the Bloom, Floetotto, and Jaimovich (2009) measure of ﬁrm-level
shocks).
The third model (Lagged st−1) explores the implications of adding lagged saving to the
list of regressors. Often in empirical macroeconomics, the addition of the lagged dependent
variable is unjustiﬁed by the underlying theory, but nevertheless is required for the model to
ﬁt the data. Here, however, serial correlation in saving is a direct implication of the model
(below we will show that the degree of serial correlation implied by the model matches the
empirical estimate fairly well). The implication arises because deviations of actual wealth
from target wealth ought to be long-lasting if the saving rate cannot quickly move actual
wealth to the target. As expected, the coeﬃcient is highly statistically signiﬁcant. However,
this positive autocorrelation only captures near-term stickiness and has little eﬀect on the
long-run dynamics of saving. Indeed, the coeﬃcients from the baseline roughly equal
their long-term counterparts from the model with lagged saving rates (that is, coeﬃcient
estimates pre-multiplied by 2.5,o r1/(1 − γs)=1 /(1 − 0.60)).
30
The fourth model (Debt) explores the role of the debt–income ratio. The variable could
be relevant for two reasons. First, it could partly account for the fact that debt is held by
a diﬀerent group of people than assets and consequently net worth might be an insuﬃcient
proxy for wealth. Second, debt might also reﬂect credit conditions (although—as mentioned
above—we prefer the CEA index because in principle it isolates the role of credit supply
from demand). The regression can thus also be interpreted as a horse-race between the
our sample is actually quite favorable to the time-only model; it would have considerably more diﬃculty with a sample that
included 10 pre-sample years without a discernable trend.
28Adding an interaction term between the CEA and wealth results in a borderline signiﬁcant positive estimate, which is
in line with the concavity of the consumption function, show in Figure 2.
29See Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2011) for related work measuring economic policy uncertainty.
30Note that with the inclusion of lagged saving, the Durbin–Watson statistic becomes close to 2, suggesting that whatever
serial correlation exists in the other speciﬁcations reﬂect simple ﬁrst order autocorrelation of the errors.
16Figure 10 The Fit of the Baseline Model and the Model with Full Controls (of
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Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, authors’ calculations.
CEA and the debt–income ratio. In any case, while the coeﬃcient γd has the correct
(negative) sign, it is statistically insigniﬁcant and its inclusion does not substantially aﬀect
estimates obtained under the baseline speciﬁcation.
The ﬁfth model (Multiple Controls) controls for the eﬀects of several other potential
determinants of household saving: expected real interest rates, expected income growth,
and government and corporate saving (both measured as a percent of GDP).
31 Some of these
factors are statistically signiﬁcant, but all are inconsequential in economic terms. A plot of
ﬁtted values in Figure 10 makes it clear that while these additional factors were potentially
important during speciﬁc episodes (especially in the early 1980s), they have on average
had only a limited impact on U.S. household saving. The negative coeﬃcient on corporate
saving is consistent with the proposition that households may ‘pierce the corporate veil’ to
some extent
32 but there is no evidence for any interaction between personal and government
saving. One interpretation of this is that ‘Ricardian’ eﬀects that some prior researchers have
claimed to ﬁnd might instead reﬂect reverse causality: Recessions cause government saving
to decline at the same time that personal saving increases (high unemployment, falling
31Expected real interest rates and expected income growth are constructed using data from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters of the Philadelphia Fed.
32Regressions with total private saving as a dependent variable yield qualitatively similar results as our baseline estimates
in Table 1.
17wealth, restricted credit) but for reasons independent of the Ricardian logic (reduced tax
revenues and increased spending on automatic stabilizers, e.g.). Since we are controlling
directly for the variables (wealth, unemployment risk, credit availability) that were (in this
interpretation) proxied by government saving, we no longer ﬁnd any eﬀect of government
saving on personal saving.
The sixth model (Income Inequality) explores the idea that growing income inequality
has resulted in an increase in the aggregate saving rate, to the extent that microeco-
nomic evidence points to high personal saving rates among the higher-permanent-income
households (Carroll (2000); Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2004)). However, the econometric
evidence is mixed. We have experimented with numerous income inequality series of Piketty
and Saez (2003) (updated through 2010) in our regressions: we included income shares of
the top 10, 5, 1, 0.5, and 0.1 percent of the income distribution, either with or without
capital gains. None of these 10 series were statistically signiﬁcant in the full 1960–2010
sample; one of the estimated speciﬁcations is reported in Table 2. Some of the inequality
measures were statistically signiﬁcant in a shorter, 1980–2010, sample. In this speciﬁc
sub-sample (results not reported here), the coeﬃcients on credit conditions and net wealth
remained highly statistically signiﬁcant, although the coeﬃcient on credit conditions tended
to be more negative than in the baseline speciﬁcation. The coeﬃcient on unemployment
expectations became insigniﬁcant, which is also natural since income inequality ﬂuctuates
over the business cycle.
The seventh model (DB Pensions) examines whether the shift from deﬁned beneﬁt to
deﬁned contribution pension plans may also have had a measurable eﬀect on the aggregate
saving rate. Aggregate data on the size of deﬁned-beneﬁts pension plans are not readily
available; the NIPA provides the relevant series only since 1988. As an initial experiment,
we calculated the share of employer contributions accruing to the deﬁned beneﬁt plans as a
percent of total contributions; however, this variable was not statistically signiﬁcant in our
regressions (sample 1988–2010). As an alternative, we compiled a measure of household
saving adjusted for the deﬁned-beneﬁt pension plans from various research publications by
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA; Kmitch (2010), Perozek and Reinsdorf (2002)) and
Congressional Budget Oﬃce (CBO; Congressional Budget Oﬃce (1993)). Subsequently, we
calculated “a pension gap,” deﬁned as the diﬀerence between the headline saving rate and
the BEA/CBO adjusted saving rate, and included this gap variable in our regressions
(sample: 1960–2007). The gap is statistically signiﬁcant with a coeﬃcient of about 0.7.
This suggests that the shift from deﬁned beneﬁt to deﬁned contribution pension plans may
have reduced the aggregate saving rate. However, this eﬀect appears small in economic
terms: the contribution of the changing pension system to the overall decline in the saving
rate since the 1980s is only about 1 percentage point of disposable income. The coeﬃcients
on the baseline series (credit conditions, net wealth, unemployment expectations) remain
highly statistically signiﬁcant in this regression.
The eighth and ninth models (High Tax Bracket and Low Tax Bracket) provide a ﬁrst-
pass test of the eﬀects of tax policy on aggregate saving by including the data on the
18highest and lowest marginal tax rates in our regressions. Neither of the two variables are
statistically signiﬁcant.
Finally, to explore how much endogeneity may matter,
33 the speciﬁcation “IV” re-
estimates the baseline speciﬁcation using the IV estimator. Instruments are the lags of net
wealth, unemployment risk and—crucially—the Financial Liberalization Index of Abiad,
Detragiache, and Tressel (2008) (described in Appendix 1). The FLI is an alternative
measure of credit conditions constructed using the records about legal and regulatory
changes in the banking sector. The index intends to capture exogenous changes in credit
conditions. While it is a rough approximation as it reﬂects only the most important
events (see also Figure 15 in Appendix 1), the proﬁle of the FLI matches well that of the
CEA. The estimated coeﬃcients remain broadly unchanged compared with the baseline
speciﬁcation.
We have also estimated speciﬁcations with other potential determinants of saving, whose
detailed results we do not report here. As in Parker (2000), variables capturing demo-
graphic trends such as the old-age dependency ratio were insigniﬁcant in our regressions.
The importance of population aging in cross–country studies of household saving (for
example, Bloom, Canning, Mansﬁeld, and Moore (2007)a n dBosworth and Chodorow-
Reich (2007)) appears to be largely driven by the experience of Japan and Korea—countries
well ahead of the United States in the population aging process.
4.3 Sub-Sample Stability
When the model is estimated only using the post-1980 data in Table 3 (Post-1980), its ﬁt
measured by the ¯ R2 actually improves, in contrast with many other economic relationships,
whose goodness-of-ﬁt deteriorated in the past 20 years. The F test does not reject the
proposition that the regression coeﬃcients have remained stable over the sample period.
Allowing for a structural break at the start of the Great Recession in 2007q4 (column ‘Pre-
2008’) does not aﬀect much the baseline estimates. (The estimated values of the post-2007
interaction dummies and their standard errors are of course not particularly meaningful
because the relevant sub-sample only consists of 13 observations.)
To address the potential criticism that saving rate regressions are diﬃcult to interpret
because aggregate income shocks reﬂect a mix of transitory and persistent factors, we
have also re-estimated our regressions with alternative measures of disposable income (see
Appendix 2) which exclude a range of identiﬁable temporary shocks such as ﬁscal stimulus
and extreme weather. There was little econometric evidence that transitory movements in
aggregate disposable income are substantial and our econometric results basically did not
change.
34
33As mentioned above, wealth is lagged by one quarter to alleviate endogeneity in OLS regressions. However, a standard
concern about reduced-form regressions like (4) is that the OLS coeﬃcient estimates might be biased because the regressions
do not adequately account for all relevant right-hand size variables (such as expectations about income growth; see also
Appendix 2 for further discussion).
34Interestingly, an auxiliary regression of income growth on the lagged saving rate in the spirit of Campbell (1987) yields
statistically insigniﬁcant slope when post-1985 data are included (see Table 8 in Appendix 2).
194.4 Saving Rate Decompositions
Table 4 reports an in-sample ﬁt of the baseline model and the model Interact with the CEA–
uncertainty interaction term of Table 1, together with the contributions of the individual
variables to the explained increase in the saving rate between 2007 and 2010. Two principal
conclusions emerge. First, both models (especially the latter) are able to capture well the
observed change in the saving rate. Second, the key explanatory factors in saving were the
changes in wealth and uncertainty, with credit conditions (as measured by CEA) playing a
less important role. While the change in the trajectory of the CEA index is quite striking
(see Figure 7), and may explain the sudden academic interest in the role of household credit
over the business cycle (see the papers cited in the introduction), this evidence suggests
that the rise in saving cannot be primarily attributed to the decline in credit availability.
If correct, this ﬁnding is particularly important at the present juncture because it suggests
that however much the health of the ﬁnancial sector continues improving, the saving rate
is likely to remain high so long as uncertainty remains high and household wealth remains
impaired (compared, at least, to its previous heights).
5 Structural Estimation
This section estimates the structural model of section 2 by minimizing the distance between
the data on saving implied by the model and the corresponding empirical data. The
nonlinear least squares (NLLS) procedure employed here has some advantages over the
reduced-form regressions. Besides arguably being more immune to endogeneity and suitable
for estimating structural parameters (such as the discount factor), it imposes on the data
a structure that makes the parameter values easier to interpret. As Figure 2 documents,
the structural model also explicitly justiﬁes and disciplines non-linearities, which can be
important especially during turbulent times, when the shocks are large enough to move
the system far from its steady state.
5.1 Estimation Procedure
We assume households instantaneously observe exogenous movements in three variables:
wealth shocks m, unemployment risk  and credit supply conditions CEA, and that they
consider the shocks to  and CEA to be permanent, and do not expect the shocks to wealth
to be reversed.
35 Given these observables, consumers re-optimize their consumption–saving
choice in each period. Collecting the parameters in vector Θ and denoting the target wealth
ˇ mt(·) and the corresponding wealth gap mt− ˇ mt, the model implies a series of saving rates
35The assumption that households believe the shocks to be permanent is necessary for us to be able to use the tractable
model we described earlier in the paper. While indefensible as a literal proposition (presumably nobody believes the
unemployment rate will remain high forever), the high serial correlation of these variables means that the assumption may
not be too objectionable. In any case, a model that incorporated more realistic descriptions of these processes would be much
less transparent and might not be computationally feasible with present technology.
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
h(CEAt),(Et ut+4)
2
, (5)
where the target wealth ˇ m depends on the credit conditions and unemployment risk as
described in section 2. In our baseline speciﬁcation, the parameter vector Θ consists of the
discount factor β and the scaling constants for credit conditions and unemployment risk:
Θ={β,¯ θh,θ CEA, ¯ θ ,θ u}, (6)
ht = ¯ θh + θCEACEAt, (7)
t = ¯ θ  + θu Et ut+4. (8)
The re-scaling ensures that the unitless measure of credit conditions is re-normalized as
a fraction of disposable income and that the expected unemployment rate is transformed
into the model-compatible equivalent of permanent risk. The model implies that θCEA > 0
and θu > 0.
Minimization (5) is a non-linear least squares problem for which the standard asymptotic
results apply. Standard errors for the estimated parameters are calculated using the
delta method as follows.
36 Deﬁne the scores qt(Θ) =

smeas
t − stheor
t (Θ)
∂stheor
t (Θ)
∂Θ  and the
5 × 5 matrices E =v a r

qt(Θ)

and D = E
∂qt(Θ)
∂Θ  . The estimates have the asymptotic
distribution:
T
1/2(ˆ Θ − Θ) →d N(0,D
−1ED
 −1).
Because the saving function stheor
t (Θ) is not available in the closed form, we calculate its
partial derivatives numerically.
5.2 Results
Table 5 summarizes the calibration and estimation results. The calibrated parameters—
real interest rate r =0 .04/4, wage growth ΔW =0 .01/4 and the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion ρ =2take on their standard quarterly values and meet (together with the
discount factor β) the conditions suﬃcient for the problem to be well-deﬁned.
The estimated discount factor β =1−0.0064 = 0.9936,o r0.975 at annual frequency, lies
in the standard range. Figure 11 shows the estimated horizontal shift in the consumption
function ht. The estimates of the scaling factors ¯ θh and θCEA imply that ht varies between
0.88/4 ≈ 0.2 and (0.88 + 5.25/4) ≈ 1.5, implying that ﬁnancial deregulation resulted
at its peak in an availability of credit in 2007 that was greater than credit availability
at the beginning of our sample in 1966 by an amount equal to about 130% of annual
36To construct the objective function (which we then minimize over Θ) we need to solve the consumer’s optimization
for each quarter. Because the calculation is computationally demanding, we cannot apply bootstrap to calculate standard
errors. (The Shapiro–Wilk test does not reject normality of residuals.)
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Sources: Federal Reserve, accumulated scores from the question on change in the banks’ willingness to provide consumer installment loans from
the Senior Loan Oﬃcer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices, http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/, authors’ calculations.
income—not an unreasonable ﬁgure (note that this ﬁgure should not be compared with
the aggregate debt ratio, which peaked at around 135 percent of disposable income, but
with the total amount of net wealth which is substantially higher). Figure 12 shows the
estimated quarterly intensity of perceived permanent unemployment risk.
Figure 13 shows the ﬁt of the structural model. In terms of ¯ R2 (Table 5), the model
captures more than 80 percent of variation in the saving rate, doing only slightly worse
than our baseline reduced-form model (whose ¯ R2 is roughly 0.9). The Mincer–Zarnowitz
horse race between the models puts weight of 0.72 on the structural model.
In principle, time variation in the ﬁtted saving rate arises as a result of movements in its
three time-varying determinants: uncertainty, wealth, and credit conditions, see Figure 14.
To gauge the relative importance of the three main explanatory variables, we sequentially
switch oﬀ the uncertainty and credit supply channels by setting the values of these series
equal to their sample means. Note that the diﬀerence between the ﬁtted series (red/grey
line) and the ﬁtted series excluding uncertainty (black line) should be interpreted as the
eﬀect of time variation in unemployment risk  rather than the total amount of saving
attributable to uncertainty. The main takeaway from the Figure is that the CEA is essential
in capturing the trend decline in the PSR between the 1980s and the early 2000s. The
wealth ﬂuctuations contribute to a good ﬁt of the model at the business-cycle frequencies,
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Sources: Thomson Reuters/University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers, http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/main.php, Bureau of Labor Statistics,
authors’ calculations.
23Figure 13 Fit of the Structural Model—Actual and Fitted PSR (Percent of Disposable
Income)
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Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, authors’ calculations.
24Figure 14 Decomposition of Fitted PSR (Percent of Disposable Income)
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and the principal role of cyclical ﬂuctuations in uncertainty is to magnify the increases in
the PSR during recessions.
Table 6 replicates the estimates of Table 1 for the artiﬁcial saving series generated by
the estimated structural model. The coeﬃcient estimates closely mirror those obtained
from actual data which means that the structural model captures well the key features
of the saving data. Unsurprisingly, the standard errors are somewhat smaller than those
in Table 1 and the ¯ R2s are higher because the process of generating artiﬁcial data by the
model eliminates much of the noise present in the actual PSR data.
6 Conclusions
We ﬁnd evidence that credit availability, shocks to household wealth, and movements
in income uncertainty proxied by unemployment risk have all been important factors
in driving U.S. household saving over the past 45 years. In particular, the relentless
expansion of credit supply between the early-1980s and 2007 (likely largely reﬂecting
ﬁnancial innovation and liberalization), along with higher asset values and consequent
increases in net wealth (possibly also partly attributable to the credit boom) encouraged
households to save less out of their disposable income. At the same time, the ﬂuctuations
25in net wealth and labor income uncertainty, for instance during and after the burst of
the information technology and credit bubbles of 2001 and 2007, can explain the bulk of
business cycle ﬂuctuations in personal saving.
We also ﬁnd that other determinants of saving suggested by various literatures (e.g.,
ﬁscal deﬁcits, demographics, income expectations) either work through the key factors
above, are of second-order importance, or matter only during particular episodes. These
ﬁndings are broadly in line with the complementary household-level evidence reported in
Dynan and Kohn (2007), Moore and Palumbo (2010), Bricker, Bucks, Kennickell, Mach,
and Moore (2011), Mian, Rao, and Suﬁ (2011)a n dPetev, Pistaferri, and Eksten (2011).
37
There can be little doubt that factors aside from those which are the primary focus in our
model have had some eﬀect on U.S. saving dynamics over our sample period. For example,
Sabelhaus and Song (2010) show a substantial decline in the size of both transitory and
permanent shocks to income over the past 40 years; this should have led to a decline in
precautionary saving that is probably not fully captured by the fact that our measure of
unemployment risk is only somewhat lower in the latter than in the earlier part of our
sample. Despite our extensive robustness checks reported in Table 2, factors such as the
shift from deﬁned beneﬁt to deﬁned contribution pension plans, changing rates of taxation,
or the large increase in income inequality that has taken place since the mid-1970s might
have played a more important role than suggested by our regressions due to diﬃcult-to-
tackle measurement issues. Real progress on such questions will likely require the use of
good “natural experiments” in a microeconomic setting.
Finally, it is worth keeping in mind that our econometric evidence is based on historical
data and, going forward, factors such as rapidly rising federal debt or the retirement
of baby-boomers could yet lead to new structural shifts in household saving. But our
results suggest that the personal saving rate in the pre-crisis period was artiﬁcially low
because of the bubble in housing prices and the corresponding easy availability of credit.
Neither of these factors are likely to return soon, and since consensus forecasts suggest
that the unemployment rate may remain elevated for a long time, there seems to be little
prospect that the personal saving rate could return to its low pre-crisis value anytime in
the foreseeable future.
37Dynan and Kohn (2007) ﬁnd that data from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and the Michigan
Survey of Consumer Sentiment show too little variation in the measures of impatience, risk aversion, expected income, interest
rates and demographics to adequately explain the household indebtedness. In contrast, they argue that house prices and
ﬁnancial innovation have been important drivers of indebtedness. Moore and Palumbo (2010) document that the drop in
consumer spending during the Great Recession was accompanied by signiﬁcant erosions of home and corporate equity held
by households. Using SCF data, Bricker, Bucks, Kennickell, Mach, and Moore (2011) document higher desired precautionary
saving among most families during the Great Recession. Mian, Rao, and Suﬁ (2011) use county- and zip-code-level data
to document that the recent decline in consumption was much stronger in high leverage counties with large house prices
declines. Petev, Pistaferri, and Eksten (2011) discuss the following factors behind the observed changes in consumption
during the Great Recession: the wealth eﬀect, an increase in uncertainty and the credit crunch. Dynan (2012) ﬁnds that
highly indebted households cut spending more strongly that their less-indebted counterparts despite experiencing smaller
declines in net worth.
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Appendix 1: Comparison of Alternative Measures of
Credit Availability
Figure 15 compares three measures of credit availability: our baseline CEA index, the Index of
Financial Liberalization constructed by Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2008)f o ran u m b e ro f
countries including the United States, and the ratio of household liabilities to disposable income.
The Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel index is a mixture of indicators of ﬁnancial development:
credit controls and reserve requirements, aggregate credit ceilings, interest rate liberalization,
banking sector entry, capital account transactions, development of securities markets and banking
sector supervision. The correlation coeﬃcient between this measure and CEA is about 90 percent.
For comparison, the ﬁgure also includes the ratio of liabilities to disposable income (from the
Flow of Funds), which is however determined inﬂuenced by the interaction between credit supply
and demand.
32Figure 16 Growth of Real Disposable Income (Percent)
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Legend: BEA disposable income: Thick red/grey line, “Less cleaned” disposable income series: Thin black line, “More cleaned”
disposable income series: Dashed black line. Shading—NBER recessions.
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, authors’ calculations.
Appendix 2: Stochastic Properties of Aggregate
Disposable Income
Measurement of Disposable Income
This appendix investigates the properties of three measures of disposable income: the oﬃcial series
produced by the BEA and two alternative “cleaned” series, in which we aim to exclude transitory
income shocks due to temporary events, such as weather and ﬁscal policy. Speciﬁcally, we have
removed the following events from the oﬃcial disposable income series using regressions:
• The dollar amounts of temporary rebate checks during 1975, 2008, and 2009 ﬁscal stimulus
episodes.
• Dummies for the 20 costliest tropical cyclones using data from the National Weather Service.
• Dummies for quarters with unusually high or low cooling degree days, and unusually high
or low heating degree days (the dummy has a value of 1 whenever the seasonally-adjusted
series are more than 2 standard deviations above or below its mean).
• Dummies for quarters with unusually high or low national temperature, and unusually high
or low precipitation (again, using the 2 standard deviations criterion).
33Figure 17 Personal Saving Rate (Percent of Disposable Income)
2
4
6
8
1
0
1
2
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Legend: BEA personal saving rate: Thick red/grey line, PSR calculated with the “less cleaned” income series: Thin black
line, PSR calculated with the “more cleaned” income series: Dashed black line. Shading—NBER recessions.
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis, authors’ calculations.
• Separate dummies for snowstorms or heat waves which were deemed unusually extensive
and damaging (these events do not necessarily overlap with the episodes identiﬁed from the
national temperature and cooling/heating degree days data).
The “less cleaned” disposable income series removes from published data the contributions of
stimulus and heating/cooling day extremes. The “more cleaned” series removes all the sources of
transitory ﬂuctuations outlined above.
Stochastic Properties of Disposable Income and Saving for a Rainy Day
The classic paper by Campbell (1987) derived that the permanent income hypothesis implies that
saving is negatively related to future expected income growth. This appendix investigates the
univariate stochastic properties of disposable income and the relationship between saving and
income, or the lack of it, in Tables 7 and 8, respectively.
Table 7 documents that all three disposable income series are statistically indistinguishable
from a random walk. This means that (changes in) the series are unpredictable using their own
lags. In particular, for the income series in log-level, the ﬁrst autocorrelations are very close to
1 and the augmented Dickey–Fuller test does not reject the null of a unit root. In contrast, for
income growth, the ﬁrst and other autocorrelations are zero, as also documented by the p values
of the Box–Ljung Q statistic, and the ADF test (of course) strongly rejects a unit root.
34Table 8 reports the estimates of α1 the sensitivity of the saving rate to future income growth:
st = α0 + α1Δyt+1 + εt, (9)
which is motivated by Campbell (1987), who derives that under the permanent income hypothesis
the coeﬃcient α1 is negative, as households save more when they are pessimistic about future
income growth.
Overall, the estimates suggest that coeﬃcient α1 is statistically insigniﬁcant and small, espe-
cially when the full sample, 1966q2–2011q1, is used and when income growth Δyt+2 enters the
regression (9), which might be justiﬁed because of time aggregation issues. While there is some
evidence of a negative coeﬃcient in the pre-1985 sample (which overlaps with the sample 1953q2–
1984q4 considered by Campbell (1987)), the relationship seems to break down in the past 20
years.
35Table 1 Preliminary Saving Regressions and the Time Trend
st = γ0 + γmmt + γCEACEAt + γEuEt ut+4 + γtt + γuC(Et ut+4 × CEAt)+εt
Model Time Wealth CEA Un Risk All 3 Baseline Interact
γ0 11.954∗∗∗ 25.202∗∗∗ 9.321∗∗∗ 8.241∗∗∗ 14.896∗∗∗ 15.226∗∗∗ 15.550∗∗∗
(0.608) (1.727) (0.574) (0.420) (2.558) (2.157) (2.556)
γm −2.606∗∗∗ −1.124∗∗∗ −1.183∗∗∗ −1.368∗∗∗
(0.319) (0.423) (0.347) (0.456)
γCEA −14.138∗∗∗ −5.472∗∗∗ −6.121∗∗∗ −4.604∗∗∗
(1.736) (1.936) (0.573) (1.721)
γEu 0.670∗∗∗ 0.316∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗
(0.055) (0.117) (0.075) (0.108)
γt −0.044∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ −0.005 0.004
(0.005) (0.003) (0.011) (0.002) (0.014) (0.014)
γuC −0.321∗∗
(0.158)
¯ R2 0.703 0.846 0.825 0.881 0.895 0.895 0.899
F stat p val 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
DW stat 0.305 0.686 0.500 0.863 0.936 0.933 0.980
Notes: Estimation sample: 1966q2–2011q1. {∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗} = Statistical signiﬁcance at {10,5,1} percent. Newey–West standard
errors, 4 lags.
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37Table 3 Additional Saving Regressions II.—Sub-sample Stability
st = γ0 + γmmt + γCEACEAt + γEuEt ut+4 + εt
Model Baseline Post-1980 Pre-2008
γ0 15.226∗∗∗ 16.692∗∗ 16.002∗∗∗
(2.157) (7.571) (1.340)
γm −1.183∗∗∗ −1.503 −1.327∗∗∗
(0.347) (1.248) (0.215)
γCEA −6.121∗∗∗ −4.999∗∗ −6.002∗∗∗
(0.573) (2.000) (0.369)
γEu 0.287∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗ 0.288∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.136) (0.053)
γ0post80/γ0post07 −1.479 11.891
(7.905) (24.356)
γmpost80/γmpost07 0.559 −1.234
(1.289) (1.556)
γCEApost80/γCEApost07 −2.350 5.426
(2.135) (12.414)
γEupost80/γEupost07 −0.098 −1.027
(0.162) (0.715)
¯ R2 0.895 0.899 0.903
F stat p val 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
F p val post-80/pre-08 0.16665 0.00012
DW stat 0.933 0.967 1.052
Notes: Estimation sample: 1966q2–2011q1. {∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗} = Statistical signiﬁcance at {10,5,1} percent. Newey–West standard
errors, 4 lags. CEA is the Credit Easing Accumulated Index. Pre-2008: Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors (because
post-2007 sample consists of only 13 observations).
38Table 4 Personal Saving Rate—Actual and Explained Change, 2007–2010
Variable Baseline Interact Actual Δst
γm × Δmt −1.18 ×− 1.39 = 1.64 −1.37 ×− 1.39 = 1.90
γCEA × ΔCEAt −6.12 ×− 0.11 = 0.64 −4.60 ×− 0.11 = 0.48
γEu × ΔEt ut+4 0.29 × 4.33 = 1.24 0.38 × 4.33 = 1.67
γuC × Δ(Et ut+4 × CEAt) −0.32 × 3.33 = −1.07
Explained Δst 3.53 2.98 2.93
39Table 5 Calibration and Structural Estimates
stheor
t = stheor
t

Θ;mt − ˇ m(¯ ht,t)

,
¯ ht = ¯ θh + θCEACEAt,
t = ¯ θ  + θu Et ut+4.
Parameter Description Value
Calibrated Parameters
r Interest Rate 0.04/4
ΔW Wage Growth 0.01/4
ρ Relative Risk Aversion 2
Estimated Parameters Θ={β,¯ θh,θ CEA, ¯ θ ,θ u}
β Discount Rate 1 − 0.0064∗∗∗
(0.0016)
¯ θh Scaling of CEAt to ¯ ht 0.8751
(1.6636)
θCEA Scaling of CEAt to ¯ ht 5.2504∗∗
(2.6012)
¯ θ  Scaling of Et ut+4 to t 6.3218×10−5∗∗
(3.1300×10−5)
θu Scaling of Et ut+4 to t 2.6079×10−4
(4.7670×10−4)
¯ R2 0.884
DW stat 1.057
Sample average of CEAt 0.5129
Sample average of Et ut+4 0.0618
Notes: Quarterly calibration. Estimation sample: 1966q2–2011q1. {∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗} = Statistical signiﬁcance at {10,5,1} percent.
Standard errors (in parentheses) were calculated with the delta method. Parameter estimates imply sample averages of 3.57
and 0.000079 for ¯ ht and  t, respectively.
40Table 6 Preliminary Saving Regressions and the Time Trend—Saving Rate Generated
by the Structural Model
st = γ0 + γmmt + γCEACEAt + γEuEt ut+4 + γtt + γuC(Et ut+4 × CEAt)+εt
Model Time Wealth CEA Un Risk All 3 Baseline Interact
γ0 11.950∗∗∗ 24.776∗∗∗ 9.146∗∗∗ 8.197∗∗∗ 14.125∗∗∗ 13.868∗∗∗ 14.321∗∗∗
(0.522) (1.433) (0.434) (0.227) (0.851) (0.759) (0.839)
γm −2.527∗∗∗ −1.012∗∗∗ −0.966∗∗∗ −1.085∗∗∗
(0.267) (0.142) (0.121) (0.139)
γCEA −14.901∗∗∗ −6.885∗∗∗ −6.379∗∗∗ −6.625∗∗∗
(1.307) (0.786) (0.148) (0.808)
γEu 0.672∗∗∗ 0.298∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.042) (0.025) (0.045)
γt −0.044∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ −0.048∗∗∗ 0.004 0.006
(0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.001) (0.006) (0.005)
γuC −0.096
(0.065)
¯ R2 0.761 0.908 0.907 0.955 0.974 0.974 0.974
F stat p val 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
DW stat 0.261 0.757 0.613 1.359 2.218 2.209 2.256
Notes: Estimation sample: 1966q2–2011q1. {∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗} = Statistical signiﬁcance at {10,5,1} percent. Newey–West standard
errors, 4 lags.
41Table 7 Univariate Properties of Disposable Income and Personal Saving Rate
Series Oﬃcial BEA Less Cleaned More Cleaned
Disposable Income—Log-level
First Autocorrelation 0.983 0.983 0.983
Box–Ljung Q stat, p value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Augmented Dickey–Fuller test, p value 0.505 0.515 0.501
Disposable Income—Growth Rate
First Autocorrelation −0.043 −0.033 −0.024
Box–Ljung Q stat, p value 0.604 0.446 0.334
Augmented Dickey–Fuller test, p value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Personal Saving Rate
First Autocorrelation 0.953 0.953 0.952
Box–Ljung Q stat, p value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Augmented Dickey–Fuller test, p value 0.628 0.600 0.539
Notes: Box–Ljung statistics: 8 lags, ADF test: 4 lags.
42Table 8 Campbell (1987) Saving for a Rainy Day Regressions
Series Oﬃcial BEA Less Cleaned More Cleaned
Full Sample: 1966Q2–2011Q1
st = α0 + α1Δyt+1 + εt
α1 −0.046 −0.054 −0.065
(0.052) (0.050) (0.051)
¯ R2 −0.002 −0.000 0.002
st = α0 + α1Δyt+2 + εt
α1 0.017 0.009 −0.009
(0.050) (0.047) (0.047)
¯ R2 −0.005 −0.006 −0.006
Pre-1985 Sample: 1966Q2–1984Q4
st = α0 + α1Δyt+1 + εt
α1 −0.108∗∗∗ −0.105∗∗∗ −0.117∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.031) (0.033)
¯ R2 0.143 0.128 0.150
st = α0 + α1Δyt+2 + εt
α1 −0.056 −0.060∗ −0.083∗∗
(0.039) (0.036) (0.033)
¯ R2 0.029 0.034 0.070
Notes: {∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗} = Statistical signiﬁcance at {10,5,1} percent. Newey–West standard errors, 4
lags.
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